Free BECC-108 Solved Assignment | July 2023-January 2024 |Intermediate Microeconomics-II | IGNOU

BECC-108 Solved Assignment

Title of Course: Intermediate Microeconomics-II

Section I: Long answer questions (word limit – 500 words). Each question carries 2 0 2 0 20\mathbf{2 0}20 marks.
  1. (a) Explain the features of a monopoly market structure. What are the characteristics of a natural monopoly?
    (b) How does a monopolist decide its profit maximising output? Explain with the help of appropriate diagram.
  2. (a) Consider a duopoly of firm 1 and 2 producing a homogenous product, the demand of which is described by the following demand function:
Q = 1 / 2 ( 100 P ) Q = 1 / 2 ( 100 P ) Q=1//2(100-P)\mathrm{Q}=1 / 2(100-\mathrm{P})Q=1/2(100P)
Where Q is total production of both firms (i.e., Q = Q 1 + Q 2 Q = Q 1 + Q 2 Q=Q_(1)+Q_(2)\mathrm{Q}=\mathrm{Q}_1+\mathrm{Q}_2Q=Q1+Q2 ) marginal cost of production faced by both firms be Rs. 40 , i.e. MC 1 = MC 2 = 20 MC 1 = MC 2 = 20 MC_(1)=MC_(2)=20\mathrm{MC}_1=\mathrm{MC}_2=20MC1=MC2=20. Calculate the residual demand function for both the firms. Using them ascertain their reaction curves and the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantity produced by each firm?
(b) Discuss the dominant strategy and dominated strategy in a game through an example. Is Nash equilibrium always indicated dominant strategy? Why or why not? Explain.
Section II: Medium answer questions (word limit – 2 5 0 2 5 0 250\mathbf{2 5 0}250 words). Each question carries 1 0 1 0 10\mathbf{1 0}10 marks.
  1. Consider a monopolist facing an inverse demand function P ( Q ) = 10 Q P ( Q ) = 10 Q P(Q)=10-QP(Q)=10-QP(Q)=10Q, and total cost function 2 Q 2 Q 2Q2 Q2Q + Q 2 + Q 2 +Q^(2)+Q^2+Q2. Calculate the deadweight loss associated with this market condition.
  2. What do you understand by the term ‘adverse selection’? Discuss with the reference to market for lemons.
  3. Explain the concept of contract curve by showing efficiency in production. How is pareto optimality related to the contract curve? Discuss.
Section III: Short answer questions (word limit – 100 words). Each question carries6 marks.
  1. Bring out the difference between the general equilibrium analysis and partial equilibrium analysis.
  2. What are the inefficiencies related to a positive externality? Explain with the help of a diagram.
  3. Explain the concept of price discrimination with reference to first degree price discrimination.
  4. Distinguish between the classical utilitarian social welfare function and the minimax social welfare function.
  5. Differentiate between a sequential game and a simultaneous game with the help of examples.

EXPERT ANSWER

Question:-01(a)

 
 

Explain the features of a monopoly market structure. What are the characteristics of a natural monopoly?

Answer:

Features of a Monopoly Market Structure

A monopoly market structure is characterized by the presence of a single seller or producer who controls the entire supply of a particular good or service, with no close substitutes available. This market dominance allows the monopolist to exert significant control over prices and output. The key features of a monopoly market structure include:
  1. Single Seller: In a monopoly, there is only one producer or seller in the market. This single entity has complete control over the supply of the product or service, making it the sole provider.
  2. No Close Substitutes: The product offered by the monopolist has no close substitutes, meaning consumers cannot easily switch to a different product. This lack of alternatives gives the monopolist significant market power.
  3. Price Maker: Unlike in competitive markets, where prices are determined by the forces of supply and demand, a monopolist can set prices. As a price maker, the monopolist can influence the price by adjusting the level of output.
  4. High Barriers to Entry: Monopolies are characterized by significant barriers to entry, which prevent other firms from entering the market. These barriers can include high startup costs, control over essential resources, legal restrictions, or technological superiority.
  5. Profit Maximization: The monopolist seeks to maximize profits by setting a price where marginal cost equals marginal revenue (MC = MR). By restricting output, the monopolist can charge higher prices, leading to supernormal profits.
  6. Limited Consumer Choice: With only one supplier in the market, consumers have limited options and must purchase the product at the price set by the monopolist.
  7. Potential for Inefficiency: Monopolies may lead to allocative and productive inefficiency. Since there is no competition, the monopolist may not have an incentive to minimize costs or innovate, leading to higher prices and lower-quality products for consumers.

Characteristics of a Natural Monopoly

A natural monopoly occurs when a single firm can supply the entire market at a lower cost than multiple firms, usually due to economies of scale. The key characteristics of a natural monopoly include:
  1. Economies of Scale: A natural monopoly arises when a single firm can produce at a lower average cost than any combination of two or more firms. As the firm expands production, the average cost per unit decreases, making it inefficient for multiple firms to compete.
  2. High Fixed Costs: Natural monopolies typically involve industries with very high fixed costs, such as utilities (electricity, water, gas). These high fixed costs make it impractical for new entrants to compete, as they would need to invest heavily in infrastructure.
  3. Essential Services: Natural monopolies often provide essential services that require significant infrastructure, such as railways, water supply, and electricity distribution. These services are critical for public welfare, and having multiple providers would lead to unnecessary duplication of resources.
  4. Regulation: Because natural monopolies provide essential services, they are often subject to government regulation to prevent the monopolist from exploiting its market power. Regulators may control prices, set quality standards, and ensure that the service is accessible to all consumers.
  5. Inelastic Demand: The demand for the products or services provided by a natural monopoly is often inelastic, meaning that consumers are less sensitive to changes in price. This inelasticity further reinforces the monopolist’s control over the market.
  6. Single Provider Efficiency: In a natural monopoly, having a single provider is more efficient than having multiple providers because it minimizes costs associated with infrastructure and production. This efficiency justifies the existence of a monopoly in such markets.
In summary, while monopolies in general have the potential to lead to market inefficiencies and consumer harm, natural monopolies can be beneficial in certain industries where a single provider can deliver services more efficiently and at a lower cost than multiple competitors. However, due to the potential for abuse of market power, natural monopolies are often regulated by the government to protect consumer interests.
 
 
 
 

Question:-01(b)

 
 

How does a monopolist decide its profit maximising output? Explain with the help of appropriate diagram.

Answer:

1. Introduction to Monopoly and Profit Maximization:
A monopoly is a market structure where a single firm dominates the entire market, producing a unique product with no close substitutes. This market power allows the monopolist to control prices and output levels, unlike in competitive markets where firms are price takers. One of the primary objectives of a monopolist, like any profit-driven entity, is to maximize profits. The process by which a monopolist determines its profit-maximizing output involves careful consideration of costs, revenue, and market demand. Understanding this decision-making process requires an analysis of the relationship between marginal cost, marginal revenue, and the demand curve.
2. Understanding Marginal Revenue and Marginal Cost:
The concepts of marginal revenue (MR) and marginal cost (MC) are central to a monopolist’s decision on output. Marginal revenue refers to the additional revenue that the firm gains from selling one more unit of its product. Unlike in competitive markets, where marginal revenue equals price, in a monopoly, marginal revenue is less than the price due to the downward-sloping demand curve. This is because, to sell additional units, the monopolist must lower the price, which applies to all previous units sold as well.
Marginal cost, on the other hand, is the additional cost incurred by producing one more unit of output. In determining the profit-maximizing level of output, a monopolist compares the marginal cost and marginal revenue. The rule for profit maximization is that the firm should produce up to the point where marginal cost equals marginal revenue (MC = MR). At this level, any additional unit produced would add more to cost than to revenue, reducing overall profit.
3. The Role of the Demand Curve:
The demand curve plays a crucial role in a monopolist’s decision-making process. The demand curve shows the relationship between the price of the product and the quantity demanded by consumers. For a monopolist, the demand curve is also the average revenue (AR) curve, since it represents the price at which each unit can be sold.
Because the monopolist faces the entire market demand, it must consider how changes in output affect the price. As the monopolist increases production, it must lower the price to sell the additional units, which results in a declining marginal revenue. The monopolist’s demand curve is therefore downward-sloping, reflecting the inverse relationship between price and quantity demanded.
4. Profit Maximization Condition (MC = MR):
To determine the profit-maximizing output, the monopolist follows the condition where marginal cost equals marginal revenue (MC = MR). This is the point where the additional revenue from selling one more unit exactly equals the additional cost of producing that unit. Producing beyond this point would result in marginal cost exceeding marginal revenue, leading to a reduction in profit.
At the profit-maximizing output, the monopolist can then determine the price by looking at the demand curve. The price is set at the level that corresponds to the quantity where MC = MR. This price will generally be higher than the marginal cost, reflecting the monopolist’s ability to extract more consumer surplus due to its market power.
5. Illustrating with a Diagram:
A graphical representation can help clarify the monopolist’s profit-maximizing decision.
Imagine a graph with the quantity of output on the horizontal axis and price, cost, and revenue on the vertical axis. The downward-sloping demand curve represents the average revenue (AR) and the corresponding marginal revenue (MR) curve lies below the AR curve, reflecting the fact that MR is less than AR for a monopolist.
The marginal cost (MC) curve typically has a U-shape due to increasing and then decreasing marginal returns. The profit-maximizing output is found where the MR curve intersects the MC curve. From this point on the graph, draw a vertical line down to the quantity axis to determine the profit-maximizing quantity (Q*).
To find the profit-maximizing price, extend this vertical line upwards until it intersects the demand (AR) curve. The corresponding point on the price axis is the monopolist’s price (P*). The area between the AR curve and the MC curve at this output level represents the monopolist’s economic profit.
This diagram shows how the monopolist sets a higher price and produces a lower output compared to what would be expected in a competitive market, where price equals marginal cost (P = MC). The shaded area between the AR curve and the MC curve represents the monopolist’s profit, while the difference between the monopolist’s price and the competitive price illustrates the degree of market power.
6. Economic Implications of Monopoly Pricing:
Monopoly pricing has several implications for the economy. First, by setting prices above marginal cost, monopolists can earn supernormal profits, which are not eroded by competition. This can lead to allocative inefficiency, where resources are not distributed in a way that maximizes consumer and producer surplus. Consumers end up paying higher prices and buying less than they would in a competitive market.
Furthermore, monopolies may lead to productive inefficiency. Without competitive pressures, a monopolist might have less incentive to minimize costs, innovate, or improve product quality. This can result in higher production costs and less optimal use of resources compared to a competitive market.
Monopoly power can also have distributional effects. The higher prices charged by monopolists transfer surplus from consumers to producers, increasing inequality. Moreover, if monopolies persist over time, they can create barriers to entry for other firms, stifling innovation and technological progress.
Conclusion:
In summary, a monopolist decides its profit-maximizing output by equating marginal cost with marginal revenue (MC = MR) and setting the price based on the demand curve at this output level. This process allows the monopolist to earn higher profits by producing less output and charging higher prices than would be possible in a competitive market. While this maximizes profits for the monopolist, it often results in economic inefficiencies and negative impacts on consumer welfare. The understanding of how monopolists operate is crucial for policymakers and economists when considering the regulation of markets and the promotion of competition.
 
 
 
 

Question:-02(a)

 
 

Consider a duopoly of firm 1 and 2 producing a homogenous product, the demand of which is described by the following demand function:

Q = 1 / 2 ( 100 P ) Q = 1 / 2 ( 100 P ) Q=1//2(100-P)\mathrm{Q}=1 / 2(100-\mathrm{P})Q=1/2(100P)
Where Q is total production of both firms (i.e., Q = Q 1 + Q 2 Q = Q 1 + Q 2 Q=Q_(1)+Q_(2)\mathrm{Q}=\mathrm{Q}_1+\mathrm{Q}_2Q=Q1+Q2 ) marginal cost of production faced by both firms be Rs. 40 , i.e. MC 1 = MC 2 = 20 MC 1 = MC 2 = 20 MC_(1)=MC_(2)=20\mathrm{MC}_1=\mathrm{MC}_2=20MC1=MC2=20. Calculate the residual demand function for both the firms. Using them ascertain their reaction curves and the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantity produced by each firm?

Answer:

To solve this problem, we need to go through the following steps:
  1. Determine the market demand function in terms of price (P).
  2. Find the residual demand function for each firm.
  3. Determine the reaction functions for each firm.
  4. Solve for the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities.

1. Market Demand Function

The total market demand function is given by:
Q = 1 2 ( 100 P ) Q = 1 2 ( 100 P ) Q=(1)/(2)(100-P)Q = \frac{1}{2} (100 – P)Q=12(100P)
We can express this in terms of price (P) as follows:
P = 100 2 Q P = 100 2 Q P=100-2QP = 100 – 2QP=1002Q
Where Q = Q 1 + Q 2 Q = Q 1 + Q 2 Q=Q_(1)+Q_(2)Q = Q_1 + Q_2Q=Q1+Q2 represents the total quantity produced by both firms.

2. Residual Demand Function for Each Firm

For Firm 1, the residual demand is the demand that remains after considering the output of Firm 2. The residual demand function for Firm 1 can be expressed as:
P = 100 2 ( Q 1 + Q 2 ) P = 100 2 ( Q 1 + Q 2 ) P=100-2(Q_(1)+Q_(2))P = 100 – 2(Q_1 + Q_2)P=1002(Q1+Q2)
The residual demand function for Firm 1 in terms of Q 1 Q 1 Q_(1)Q_1Q1 is:
P 1 ( Q 1 ) = 100 2 Q 2 2 Q 1 P 1 ( Q 1 ) = 100 2 Q 2 2 Q 1 P_(1)(Q_(1))=100-2Q_(2)-2Q_(1)P_1(Q_1) = 100 – 2Q_2 – 2Q_1P1(Q1)=1002Q22Q1
Similarly, the residual demand function for Firm 2 can be expressed as:
P 2 ( Q 2 ) = 100 2 Q 1 2 Q 2 P 2 ( Q 2 ) = 100 2 Q 1 2 Q 2 P_(2)(Q_(2))=100-2Q_(1)-2Q_(2)P_2(Q_2) = 100 – 2Q_1 – 2Q_2P2(Q2)=1002Q12Q2

3. Reaction Functions

Each firm maximizes its profit by equating its marginal cost (MC) to its marginal revenue (MR).
First, let’s find the revenue for Firm 1:
Revenue for Firm 1 = P 1 ( Q 1 ) × Q 1 = ( 100 2 Q 2 2 Q 1 ) Q 1 Revenue for Firm 1 = P 1 ( Q 1 ) × Q 1 = ( 100 2 Q 2 2 Q 1 ) Q 1 “Revenue for Firm 1″=P_(1)(Q_(1))xxQ_(1)=(100-2Q_(2)-2Q_(1))Q_(1)\text{Revenue for Firm 1} = P_1(Q_1) \times Q_1 = (100 – 2Q_2 – 2Q_1)Q_1Revenue for Firm 1=P1(Q1)×Q1=(1002Q22Q1)Q1
The profit for Firm 1 is:
π 1 = ( 100 2 Q 2 2 Q 1 ) Q 1 M C 1 × Q 1 = ( 100 2 Q 2 2 Q 1 ) Q 1 40 Q 1 π 1 = ( 100 2 Q 2 2 Q 1 ) Q 1 M C 1 × Q 1 = ( 100 2 Q 2 2 Q 1 ) Q 1 40 Q 1 pi_(1)=(100-2Q_(2)-2Q_(1))Q_(1)-MC_(1)xxQ_(1)=(100-2Q_(2)-2Q_(1))Q_(1)-40Q_(1)\pi_1 = (100 – 2Q_2 – 2Q_1)Q_1 – MC_1 \times Q_1 = (100 – 2Q_2 – 2Q_1)Q_1 – 40Q_1π1=(1002Q22Q1)Q1MC1×Q1=(1002Q22Q1)Q140Q1
To find the profit-maximizing quantity Q 1 Q 1 Q_(1)Q_1Q1, we take the derivative of the profit function with respect to Q 1 Q 1 Q_(1)Q_1Q1 and set it equal to zero:
d π 1 d Q 1 = 100 2 Q 2 4 Q 1 40 = 0 d π 1 d Q 1 = 100 2 Q 2 4 Q 1 40 = 0 (dpi_(1))/(dQ_(1))=100-2Q_(2)-4Q_(1)-40=0\frac{d\pi_1}{dQ_1} = 100 – 2Q_2 – 4Q_1 – 40 = 0dπ1dQ1=1002Q24Q140=0
Simplifying:
60 = 2 Q 2 + 4 Q 1 60 = 2 Q 2 + 4 Q 1 60=2Q_(2)+4Q_(1)60 = 2Q_2 + 4Q_160=2Q2+4Q1
Q 1 = 60 2 Q 2 4 Q 1 = 60 2 Q 2 4 Q_(1)=(60-2Q_(2))/(4)Q_1 = \frac{60 – 2Q_2}{4}Q1=602Q24
Q 1 = 15 1 2 Q 2 Q 1 = 15 1 2 Q 2 Q_(1)=15-(1)/(2)Q_(2)Q_1 = 15 – \frac{1}{2}Q_2Q1=1512Q2
This is Firm 1’s reaction function.
Similarly, for Firm 2:
π 2 = ( 100 2 Q 1 2 Q 2 ) Q 2 40 Q 2 π 2 = ( 100 2 Q 1 2 Q 2 ) Q 2 40 Q 2 pi_(2)=(100-2Q_(1)-2Q_(2))Q_(2)-40Q_(2)\pi_2 = (100 – 2Q_1 – 2Q_2)Q_2 – 40Q_2π2=(1002Q12Q2)Q240Q2
Taking the derivative with respect to Q 2 Q 2 Q_(2)Q_2Q2 and setting it equal to zero:
d π 2 d Q 2 = 100 2 Q 1 4 Q 2 40 = 0 d π 2 d Q 2 = 100 2 Q 1 4 Q 2 40 = 0 (dpi_(2))/(dQ_(2))=100-2Q_(1)-4Q_(2)-40=0\frac{d\pi_2}{dQ_2} = 100 – 2Q_1 – 4Q_2 – 40 = 0dπ2dQ2=1002Q14Q240=0
Simplifying:
60 = 2 Q 1 + 4 Q 2 60 = 2 Q 1 + 4 Q 2 60=2Q_(1)+4Q_(2)60 = 2Q_1 + 4Q_260=2Q1+4Q2
Q 2 = 15 1 2 Q 1 Q 2 = 15 1 2 Q 1 Q_(2)=15-(1)/(2)Q_(1)Q_2 = 15 – \frac{1}{2}Q_1Q2=1512Q1
This is Firm 2’s reaction function.

4. Cournot-Nash Equilibrium

The Cournot-Nash equilibrium occurs where the reaction functions of the two firms intersect. We solve the system of equations:
Q 1 = 15 1 2 Q 2 Q 1 = 15 1 2 Q 2 Q_(1)=15-(1)/(2)Q_(2)Q_1 = 15 – \frac{1}{2}Q_2Q1=1512Q2
Q 2 = 15 1 2 Q 1 Q 2 = 15 1 2 Q 1 Q_(2)=15-(1)/(2)Q_(1)Q_2 = 15 – \frac{1}{2}Q_1Q2=1512Q1
Substitute Q 2 = 15 1 2 Q 1 Q 2 = 15 1 2 Q 1 Q_(2)=15-(1)/(2)Q_(1)Q_2 = 15 – \frac{1}{2}Q_1Q2=1512Q1 into the first equation:
Q 1 = 15 1 2 ( 15 1 2 Q 1 ) Q 1 = 15 1 2 15 1 2 Q 1 Q_(1)=15-(1)/(2)(15-(1)/(2)Q_(1))Q_1 = 15 – \frac{1}{2}\left(15 – \frac{1}{2}Q_1\right)Q1=1512(1512Q1)
Simplifying:
Q 1 = 15 15 2 + 1 4 Q 1 Q 1 = 15 15 2 + 1 4 Q 1 Q_(1)=15-(15)/(2)+(1)/(4)Q_(1)Q_1 = 15 – \frac{15}{2} + \frac{1}{4}Q_1Q1=15152+14Q1
Q 1 1 4 Q 1 = 30 2 15 2 Q 1 1 4 Q 1 = 30 2 15 2 Q_(1)-(1)/(4)Q_(1)=(30)/(2)-(15)/(2)Q_1 – \frac{1}{4}Q_1 = \frac{30}{2} – \frac{15}{2}Q114Q1=302152
3 4 Q 1 = 15 2 3 4 Q 1 = 15 2 (3)/(4)Q_(1)=(15)/(2)\frac{3}{4}Q_1 = \frac{15}{2}34Q1=152
Q 1 = 15 2 × 4 3 Q 1 = 15 2 × 4 3 Q_(1)=(15)/(2)xx(4)/(3)Q_1 = \frac{15}{2} \times \frac{4}{3}Q1=152×43
Q 1 = 60 6 = 10 Q 1 = 60 6 = 10 Q_(1)=(60)/(6)=10Q_1 = \frac{60}{6} = 10Q1=606=10
Thus, Q 1 = 10 Q 1 = 10 Q_(1)=10Q_1 = 10Q1=10.
Substitute Q 1 = 10 Q 1 = 10 Q_(1)=10Q_1 = 10Q1=10 into the reaction function for Firm 2:
Q 2 = 15 1 2 × 10 = 10 Q 2 = 15 1 2 × 10 = 10 Q_(2)=15-(1)/(2)xx10=10Q_2 = 15 – \frac{1}{2} \times 10 = 10Q2=1512×10=10

Conclusion

In the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, both Firm 1 and Firm 2 produce 10 units each. This outcome is a result of each firm taking the other’s output decision as given and optimizing its own profit accordingly.
 
 
 
 

Question:-02(b)

 
 

Discuss the dominant strategy and dominated strategy in a game through an example. Is Nash equilibrium always indicated dominant strategy? Why or why not? Explain.

Answer:

Dominant and Dominated Strategies in Game Theory

In game theory, strategies play a crucial role in determining the outcomes for players involved in a strategic interaction. Two key concepts in this context are dominant strategy and dominated strategy.
1. Dominant Strategy:
A dominant strategy is a strategy that yields the best outcome for a player, regardless of what the other players do. In other words, if a player has a dominant strategy, they will always choose this strategy because it provides a higher payoff compared to any other strategy, no matter what the opponents’ actions are.
Example of Dominant Strategy:
Consider the classic example of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, where two suspects (Player A and Player B) are arrested for a crime. The police offer each prisoner a deal: if one confesses (defects) while the other remains silent (cooperates), the defector goes free while the silent one gets a heavy sentence. If both confess, they both get a moderate sentence. If both remain silent, they get a light sentence.
The payoff matrix can be represented as follows:
Player B: Cooperate Player B: Defect
Player A: Cooperate (2, 2) (0, 3)
Player A: Defect (3, 0) (1, 1)
  • If Player A cooperates: If Player B cooperates, Player A gets 2 (light sentence). If Player B defects, Player A gets 0 (heavy sentence).
  • If Player A defects: If Player B cooperates, Player A gets 3 (goes free). If Player B defects, Player A gets 1 (moderate sentence).
No matter what Player B does, Player A is better off defecting (confessing). Thus, defecting is a dominant strategy for Player A. Similarly, defecting is also a dominant strategy for Player B.
2. Dominated Strategy:
A dominated strategy is one that results in a worse outcome for a player compared to another strategy, regardless of what the other players do. If a player has a dominated strategy, they should never choose it because there is always a better alternative.
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma example, cooperating (remaining silent) is a dominated strategy for both players because defecting (confessing) always provides a better or equal payoff.

Nash Equilibrium and Dominant Strategies

Nash Equilibrium is a concept in game theory where each player’s strategy is optimal given the strategies of the other players. In a Nash Equilibrium, no player can unilaterally change their strategy to improve their payoff, assuming the strategies of the other players remain unchanged.
Is Nash Equilibrium Always Indicated by a Dominant Strategy?
No, Nash Equilibrium is not always indicated by a dominant strategy.
  • In some games, a Nash Equilibrium exists even when no player has a dominant strategy. This can happen in games where the best response of a player depends on the strategy chosen by the other player, and no single strategy is optimal regardless of what the opponent does.
Example Without Dominant Strategies:
Consider the Battle of the Sexes game, where a couple is deciding whether to go to a football game or a ballet. The man prefers football, and the woman prefers ballet, but both would rather be together than apart.
The payoff matrix might look like this:
Woman: Ballet Woman: Football
Man: Ballet (2, 1) (0, 0)
Man: Football (0, 0) (1, 2)
  • If the man chooses ballet, the best response for the woman is to choose ballet, and vice versa for football.
  • If the man chooses football, the woman’s best response is to choose football, and vice versa.
Here, neither player has a dominant strategy. However, there are two Nash Equilibria: one where both go to the ballet (Ballet, Ballet) and another where both go to the football game (Football, Football). Each player’s best response depends on what the other player is doing, and there is no single strategy that dominates the other.

Conclusion

In summary, a dominant strategy is one that is always the best choice for a player, regardless of the strategies of others, while a dominated strategy is one that is always worse than some other strategy. A Nash Equilibrium does not always involve dominant strategies; it occurs when each player’s strategy is the best response to the strategies of others. Some games, like the Prisoner’s Dilemma, have dominant strategies that lead to a Nash Equilibrium. However, in other games, such as the Battle of the Sexes, Nash Equilibria can occur without dominant strategies, highlighting the complexity and variability of strategic interactions in game theory.
 
 
 
 

Question:-03

 
 

Consider a monopolist facing an inverse demand function P ( Q ) = 10 Q P ( Q ) = 10 Q P(Q)=10-QP(Q)=10-QP(Q)=10Q, and total cost function 2 Q 2 Q 2Q2 Q2Q + Q 2 + Q 2 +Q^(2)+Q^2+Q2. Calculate the deadweight loss associated with this market condition.

Answer:

To calculate the deadweight loss associated with a monopolist, we need to compare the quantity produced by the monopolist with the quantity that would be produced in a perfectly competitive market. Here are the steps:

Step 1: Find the Monopolist’s Quantity and Price

  1. Inverse demand function: P ( Q ) = 10 Q P ( Q ) = 10 Q P(Q)=10-QP(Q) = 10 – QP(Q)=10Q
  2. Total cost function: C ( Q ) = 2 Q + Q 2 C ( Q ) = 2 Q + Q 2 C(Q)=2Q+Q^(2)C(Q) = 2Q + Q^2C(Q)=2Q+Q2
  3. Marginal revenue (MR):
    The revenue function is R ( Q ) = P ( Q ) × Q = ( 10 Q ) Q = 10 Q Q 2 R ( Q ) = P ( Q ) × Q = ( 10 Q ) Q = 10 Q Q 2 R(Q)=P(Q)xx Q=(10-Q)Q=10 Q-Q^(2)R(Q) = P(Q) \times Q = (10 – Q)Q = 10Q – Q^2R(Q)=P(Q)×Q=(10Q)Q=10QQ2.
    The marginal revenue is the derivative of the revenue function with respect to Q Q QQQ:
    M R = d R ( Q ) d Q = 10 2 Q M R = d R ( Q ) d Q = 10 2 Q MR=(dR(Q))/(dQ)=10-2QMR = \frac{dR(Q)}{dQ} = 10 – 2QMR=dR(Q)dQ=102Q
  4. Marginal cost (MC):
    The marginal cost is the derivative of the total cost function with respect to Q Q QQQ:
    M C = d C ( Q ) d Q = 2 + 2 Q M C = d C ( Q ) d Q = 2 + 2 Q MC=(dC(Q))/(dQ)=2+2QMC = \frac{dC(Q)}{dQ} = 2 + 2QMC=dC(Q)dQ=2+2Q
  5. Monopolist’s optimal output:
    The monopolist maximizes profit by setting M R = M C M R = M C MR=MCMR = MCMR=MC:
    10 2 Q = 2 + 2 Q 10 2 Q = 2 + 2 Q 10-2Q=2+2Q10 – 2Q = 2 + 2Q102Q=2+2Q
    8 = 4 Q Q m = 2 8 = 4 Q Q m = 2 8=4Q quad=>quadQ_(m)=28 = 4Q \quad \Rightarrow \quad Q_m = 28=4QQm=2
  6. Monopolist’s price:
    Substitute Q m = 2 Q m = 2 Q_(m)=2Q_m = 2Qm=2 into the inverse demand function to find the monopolist’s price:
    P m = 10 Q m = 10 2 = 8 P m = 10 Q m = 10 2 = 8 P_(m)=10-Q_(m)=10-2=8P_m = 10 – Q_m = 10 – 2 = 8Pm=10Qm=102=8

Step 2: Find the Competitive Market Quantity and Price

In a perfectly competitive market, firms produce where price equals marginal cost.
  1. Set P ( Q ) = M C P ( Q ) = M C P(Q)=MCP(Q) = MCP(Q)=MC:
    10 Q c = 2 + 2 Q c 10 Q c = 2 + 2 Q c 10-Q_(c)=2+2Q_(c)10 – Q_c = 2 + 2Q_c10Qc=2+2Qc
    8 = 3 Q c Q c = 8 3 2.67 8 = 3 Q c Q c = 8 3 2.67 8=3Q_(c)quad=>quadQ_(c)=(8)/(3)~~2.678 = 3Q_c \quad \Rightarrow \quad Q_c = \frac{8}{3} \approx 2.678=3QcQc=832.67
  2. Competitive price:
    Substitute Q c = 8 3 Q c = 8 3 Q_(c)=(8)/(3)Q_c = \frac{8}{3}Qc=83 into the inverse demand function:
    P c = 10 8 3 = 30 3 8 3 = 22 3 7.33 P c = 10 8 3 = 30 3 8 3 = 22 3 7.33 P_(c)=10-(8)/(3)=(30)/(3)-(8)/(3)=(22)/(3)~~7.33P_c = 10 – \frac{8}{3} = \frac{30}{3} – \frac{8}{3} = \frac{22}{3} \approx 7.33Pc=1083=30383=2237.33

Step 3: Calculate the Deadweight Loss

Deadweight loss (DWL) is the loss of economic efficiency when the equilibrium outcome is not Pareto optimal. It is the area of the triangle formed between the monopolist quantity, competitive quantity, and the demand curve.
  1. Find the DWL area:
    The DWL is the area of a triangle with the base Q c Q m Q c Q m Q_(c)-Q_(m)Q_c – Q_mQcQm and height P m M C P m M C P_(m)-MCP_m – MCPmMC at the monopolist’s output level.
    DWL = 1 2 × ( Q c Q m ) × ( P m M C m ) DWL = 1 2 × ( Q c Q m ) × ( P m M C m ) “DWL”=(1)/(2)xx(Q_(c)-Q_(m))xx(P_(m)-MC_(m))\text{DWL} = \frac{1}{2} \times (Q_c – Q_m) \times (P_m – MC_m)DWL=12×(QcQm)×(PmMCm)
    Where M C m M C m MC_(m)MC_mMCm is the marginal cost at the monopolist’s output level Q m = 2 Q m = 2 Q_(m)=2Q_m = 2Qm=2:
    M C m = 2 + 2 ( 2 ) = 6 M C m = 2 + 2 ( 2 ) = 6 MC_(m)=2+2(2)=6MC_m = 2 + 2(2) = 6MCm=2+2(2)=6
    So,
    DWL = 1 2 × ( 8 3 2 ) × ( 8 6 ) DWL = 1 2 × 8 3 2 × ( 8 6 ) “DWL”=(1)/(2)xx((8)/(3)-2)xx(8-6)\text{DWL} = \frac{1}{2} \times \left(\frac{8}{3} – 2\right) \times (8 – 6)DWL=12×(832)×(86)
    DWL = 1 2 × ( 8 3 6 3 ) × 2 DWL = 1 2 × 8 3 6 3 × 2 “DWL”=(1)/(2)xx((8)/(3)-(6)/(3))xx2\text{DWL} = \frac{1}{2} \times \left(\frac{8}{3} – \frac{6}{3}\right) \times 2DWL=12×(8363)×2
    DWL = 1 2 × 2 3 × 2 = 2 3 DWL = 1 2 × 2 3 × 2 = 2 3 “DWL”=(1)/(2)xx(2)/(3)xx2=(2)/(3)\text{DWL} = \frac{1}{2} \times \frac{2}{3} \times 2 = \frac{2}{3}DWL=12×23×2=23

Final Answer:

The deadweight loss associated with this monopolist market condition is 2 3 2 3 (2)/(3)\frac{2}{3}23.
 
 
 
 

Question:-04

 
 

What do you understand by the term ‘adverse selection’? Discuss with the reference to market for lemons.

Answer:

Adverse selection is a concept in economics and finance that refers to a situation where one party in a transaction has more or better information than the other party. This information asymmetry can lead to the selection of undesirable outcomes, as the party with less information is at a disadvantage and may make decisions that work against their own interests.

Adverse Selection in the Market for Lemons

The term "market for lemons" was popularized by economist George Akerlof in his 1970 paper titled "The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism." In this context, "lemons" refer to low-quality products, specifically used cars, which are often difficult for buyers to distinguish from high-quality cars.

The Market for Lemons Explained:

  1. Information Asymmetry:
    • In the used car market, sellers often have more information about the quality of the car than buyers do. Sellers know whether a car is a "lemon" (a low-quality, defective car) or a "peach" (a high-quality car), but buyers typically cannot tell the difference before purchasing.
  2. Impact on the Market:
    • Due to this information asymmetry, buyers are unable to accurately assess the quality of a car before buying. They might suspect that there is a higher chance of getting a lemon, leading them to offer lower prices for used cars in general.
    • High-quality car sellers, knowing that their cars are worth more, might withdraw from the market because they cannot get a fair price. As a result, the market becomes increasingly populated with lemons, as the presence of lemons drives down the average price buyers are willing to pay.
  3. Adverse Selection:
    • This situation exemplifies adverse selection: the market tends to attract more lemons than peaches because the buyers’ inability to differentiate between good and bad cars drives good cars out of the market.
    • The market for lemons becomes dominated by low-quality products, leading to market inefficiency. Ultimately, the market may even collapse if buyers lose trust entirely and decide not to participate.

Broader Implications:

The concept of adverse selection applies beyond the market for used cars. It can be seen in various markets, including:
  • Insurance: Individuals with high health risks are more likely to purchase health insurance, driving up costs and potentially leading to a situation where only those with poor health are insured, while healthy individuals opt out.
  • Credit Markets: Borrowers with poor credit histories may be more likely to apply for loans, making it harder for lenders to distinguish between high-risk and low-risk borrowers, leading to higher interest rates or reduced lending.

Conclusion

Adverse selection is a critical issue in markets where there is significant information asymmetry. It can lead to market inefficiencies and the potential collapse of markets if not addressed. Solutions to adverse selection include mechanisms that reduce information asymmetry, such as warranties, certifications, or regulatory interventions, which help restore trust and balance in the market.
 
 
 
 

Question:-05

 
 

Answer:

Concept of the Contract Curve in Production

The contract curve in economics represents all the efficient allocations of resources between two firms or individuals where no further mutual gains can be achieved. In the context of production, the contract curve shows the combinations of inputs (like labor and capital) allocated between two firms that lead to Pareto efficient outcomes, meaning that it is impossible to reallocate resources to make one firm better off without making the other firm worse off.

Production Efficiency and the Contract Curve

  1. Edgeworth Box for Production:
    • The Edgeworth Box is a useful tool to illustrate the contract curve in production. It graphically represents the allocation of two inputs (such as labor and capital) between two firms.
    • The dimensions of the box are determined by the total amount of each input available in the economy. Each point within the box represents a possible allocation of the two inputs between the two firms.
  2. Isoquants and Production Efficiency:
    • Each firm’s production function can be represented by isoquants within the Edgeworth Box. An isoquant shows all the combinations of inputs that produce a given level of output.
    • Production efficiency is achieved when the marginal rate of technical substitution (MRTS) between the two inputs is equal for both firms. This means that the rate at which one firm is willing to substitute one input for another, while maintaining the same level of output, is equal to that of the other firm.
  3. Deriving the Contract Curve:
    • The contract curve is derived by finding all the points within the Edgeworth Box where the isoquants of the two firms are tangent to each other. At these tangency points, the MRTS is the same for both firms, indicating that the inputs are being allocated efficiently between the two firms.
    • Any point on the contract curve represents a Pareto efficient allocation of resources between the two firms.

Pareto Optimality and the Contract Curve

Pareto optimality (or Pareto efficiency) is a condition where resources are allocated in such a way that it is impossible to make one individual or firm better off without making another individual or firm worse off. The concept is closely related to the contract curve:
  1. Relation to the Contract Curve:
    • The contract curve consists entirely of Pareto optimal points. Every point on the contract curve represents an allocation of inputs between the two firms where no further reallocation can improve the production of one firm without reducing the production of the other.
    • Thus, the contract curve is the locus of all Pareto optimal allocations of resources.
  2. Points Off the Contract Curve:
    • Any point inside the Edgeworth Box that is not on the contract curve represents an inefficient allocation of resources. At these points, it is possible to reallocate resources to make at least one firm better off without making the other worse off.
    • Moving towards the contract curve from any inefficient point represents a move towards greater efficiency and Pareto optimality.

Conclusion

The contract curve in production represents all the efficient allocations of resources between two firms where no further mutual gains can be made, aligning perfectly with the concept of Pareto optimality. All points on the contract curve are Pareto optimal, meaning that resources are allocated in such a way that it is impossible to make one firm better off without making the other worse off. Understanding the contract curve and its relation to Pareto optimality is crucial in ensuring efficient resource allocation in production.
 
 
 
 

Question:-06

 
 

Bring out the difference between the general equilibrium analysis and partial equilibrium analysis.

Answer:

General equilibrium analysis and partial equilibrium analysis are two fundamental approaches in economics used to understand how markets function and how they reach equilibrium. They differ in their scope, complexity, and the assumptions they make about the interdependence of markets.

Partial Equilibrium Analysis

Partial equilibrium analysis examines the equilibrium in a single market or a specific part of the economy, holding all other markets constant. It was popularized by economist Alfred Marshall and is often used for its simplicity and focus on individual markets.

Key Characteristics:

  1. Scope:
    • Focuses on a single market or sector.
    • Analyzes how changes in supply, demand, or external factors affect the equilibrium price and quantity in that particular market.
  2. Ceteris Paribus Assumption:
    • Assumes that all other factors outside the market being analyzed remain unchanged (ceteris paribus). This includes prices in other markets, consumer incomes, and the availability of goods in other sectors.
  3. Application:
    • Useful for analyzing the effects of specific policies, taxes, or subsidies on a particular market, such as the impact of a tax on cigarettes or a subsidy for renewable energy.
  4. Complexity:
    • Simpler and more straightforward to apply, as it deals with fewer variables and interactions.

Example:

  • If analyzing the market for bread, partial equilibrium would focus solely on the supply and demand for bread, assuming that prices of other goods (like butter or jam) do not change, even though they might in reality.

General Equilibrium Analysis

General equilibrium analysis examines the equilibrium across all markets in an economy simultaneously. It was developed by Léon Walras and represents a more comprehensive approach, accounting for the interdependence between different markets.

Key Characteristics:

  1. Scope:
    • Focuses on the entire economy, analyzing how different markets interact with each other.
    • Considers how changes in one market affect other markets, leading to a new overall equilibrium in the economy.
  2. Interdependence:
    • Assumes that all markets are interrelated. A change in one market can affect supply, demand, and prices in other markets.
    • For example, a change in the labor market could affect the production costs and prices in the goods market.
  3. Application:
    • Used to analyze the overall impact of policies, shocks, or changes in technology on the entire economy. It helps understand how various sectors and markets are interconnected.
    • Useful in assessing the welfare implications of policy changes or understanding the ripple effects of a shock (e.g., a sudden increase in oil prices) across the economy.
  4. Complexity:
    • More complex, as it involves analyzing multiple markets and their interactions simultaneously. Requires a more sophisticated mathematical framework.

Example:

  • In analyzing the impact of an increase in the price of oil, general equilibrium would consider how this affects not only the oil market but also transportation costs, consumer goods prices, labor markets, and ultimately, the overall economy.

Key Differences

Aspect Partial Equilibrium Analysis General Equilibrium Analysis
Scope Single market or sector Entire economy, all markets
Interdependence Ignores effects on other markets (ceteris paribus) Considers interactions and feedback effects among markets
Complexity Simpler, more straightforward More complex, involves multiple variables and markets
Application Specific policies or changes in one market Broad economic policies, economy-wide effects
Key Assumption Other markets remain constant All markets are interdependent

Conclusion

Both partial equilibrium and general equilibrium analyses are essential tools in economics, each serving different purposes. Partial equilibrium is more practical for focused, specific market analysis, while general equilibrium provides a comprehensive understanding of the interrelationships and overall functioning of the economy. Understanding when and how to apply each approach is crucial for effective economic analysis and policy-making.
 
 
 
 

Question:-07

 
 

Answer:

A positive externality occurs when a third party, not directly involved in an economic transaction, benefits from that transaction. However, because the benefits to the third parties are not reflected in the market price, the good or service is often underproduced or underconsumed relative to the socially optimal level. This underproduction leads to an inefficiency known as market failure.

The Nature of the Inefficiency

  • Underproduction: The market equilibrium quantity (where private marginal benefit equals private marginal cost) is lower than the socially optimal quantity (where social marginal benefit equals marginal cost). This is because producers and consumers do not take into account the external benefits to others.
  • Deadweight Loss: The inefficiency caused by the positive externality leads to a deadweight loss, which is a loss of economic efficiency that could have been avoided if the market produced at the socially optimal level.

Diagram Explanation

Let’s illustrate this with the help of a diagram:
  1. Axes:
    • The horizontal axis represents the quantity of the good or service.
    • The vertical axis represents the price or marginal benefit/cost.
  2. Curves:
    • Private Marginal Cost (PMC): This represents the cost to producers for each additional unit produced. It also reflects the supply curve in a competitive market.
    • Private Marginal Benefit (PMB): This represents the benefit to consumers from each additional unit consumed. It reflects the demand curve.
    • Social Marginal Benefit (SMB): This represents the total benefit to society from each additional unit, including both the private benefit to consumers and the external benefit to third parties. In the case of a positive externality, S M B > P M B S M B > P M B SMB > PMBSMB > PMBSMB>PMB.
  3. Market Equilibrium:
    • The market equilibrium occurs where the PMC (supply curve) intersects the PMB (demand curve). At this point, the quantity produced and consumed is Q m Q m Q_(m)Q_mQm, and the price is P m P m P_(m)P_mPm.
  4. Socially Optimal Equilibrium:
    • The socially optimal quantity occurs where the PMC intersects the SMB curve. This is at a higher quantity Q o p t Q o p t Q_(opt)Q_{opt}Qopt and reflects the point where the total benefit to society equals the cost. The corresponding price would be P o p t P o p t P_(opt)P_{opt}Popt.
  5. Deadweight Loss:
    • The deadweight loss is the area between the SMB and PMC curves over the range of quantities between Q m Q m Q_(m)Q_mQm and Q o p t Q o p t Q_(opt)Q_{opt}Qopt. This area represents the loss in total welfare due to the underproduction of the good or service.

Diagram

original image
  • Q m Q m Q_(m)Q_mQm: Market equilibrium quantity (underproduction due to positive externality).
  • Q o p t Q o p t Q_(opt)Q_{opt}Qopt: Socially optimal quantity.
  • P m P m P_(m)P_mPm: Market equilibrium price.
  • P o p t P o p t P_(opt)P_{opt}Popt: Socially optimal price.

Explanation

  • Underproduction: The quantity Q m Q m Q_(m)Q_mQm is lower than Q o p t Q o p t Q_(opt)Q_{opt}Qopt, indicating that the market fails to produce enough of the good from a societal perspective.
  • Deadweight Loss: The shaded area between the SMB and PMC curves from Q m Q m Q_(m)Q_mQm to Q o p t Q o p t Q_(opt)Q_{opt}Qopt represents the welfare loss. This area reflects the benefits that could have been achieved if the good were produced at the socially optimal level.

Conclusion

In the presence of a positive externality, markets typically underproduce the good or service, leading to a suboptimal allocation of resources. This inefficiency results in a deadweight loss, representing the potential welfare that society misses out on due to the market’s failure to account for the external benefits. Policymakers can intervene through subsidies, tax incentives, or regulations to encourage production and consumption closer to the socially optimal level, thereby reducing the inefficiency.
 
 
 
 

Question:-08

 
 

Explain the concept of price discrimination with reference to first degree price discrimination.

Answer:

Price discrimination is a pricing strategy where a seller charges different prices to different customers for the same product or service, based on the customer’s willingness to pay, rather than differences in cost. The goal is to capture consumer surplus—the difference between what consumers are willing to pay and what they actually pay—by charging each consumer the maximum they are willing to pay.

Types of Price Discrimination

There are three main types of price discrimination:
  1. First-Degree (or Perfect) Price Discrimination: Charging each consumer the maximum price they are willing to pay.
  2. Second-Degree Price Discrimination: Charging different prices based on the quantity consumed or the version of the product.
  3. Third-Degree Price Discrimination: Charging different prices to different groups of consumers based on their price elasticity of demand.

First-Degree Price Discrimination (Perfect Price Discrimination)

First-degree price discrimination occurs when a seller charges each consumer their exact willingness to pay, thereby capturing the entire consumer surplus. This type of discrimination is also known as "perfect" price discrimination because, in theory, it allows the seller to extract all the surplus from consumers, leaving them with no consumer surplus.

Key Characteristics:

  1. Individual Pricing:
    • The seller must know the exact maximum price each consumer is willing to pay for the product or service. This requires detailed knowledge of each consumer’s demand curve, which is often difficult to obtain in practice.
  2. Elimination of Consumer Surplus:
    • In first-degree price discrimination, the consumer surplus is completely transferred to the producer. Consumers pay a price exactly equal to their maximum willingness to pay for each unit they purchase.
  3. Efficiency:
    • First-degree price discrimination can lead to allocative efficiency, as the product is provided to everyone who values it at least as much as the cost of production. However, the entire surplus is captured by the producer, which might raise concerns about fairness.

Example:

A classic example of first-degree price discrimination can be found in auctions, where each bidder offers the maximum amount they are willing to pay for an item. The seller captures the highest possible price from each bidder, effectively practicing first-degree price discrimination.
Another example could be a car dealership where the salesperson negotiates the price with each customer, attempting to charge them as close as possible to their willingness to pay.

Implications of First-Degree Price Discrimination:

  1. Producer Benefit:
    • The producer captures all the surplus, maximizing their profits.
  2. Consumer Impact:
    • Consumers end up paying the maximum they are willing to pay, leaving them with no surplus. This can be seen as a disadvantage for consumers in terms of their welfare.
  3. Market Efficiency:
    • The market can be more efficient in terms of allocation because the good or service is distributed to those who value it the most. However, the distribution of surplus is entirely skewed towards the producer.

Conclusion:

First-degree price discrimination represents an idealized scenario where a firm can perfectly segment its market and charge each consumer exactly what they are willing to pay. While it can lead to allocative efficiency, it also raises concerns about fairness and equity, as it eliminates consumer surplus entirely. In practice, achieving true first-degree price discrimination is rare, but understanding the concept is crucial for analyzing pricing strategies and market outcomes.
 
 
 
 

Question:-09

 
 

Distinguish between the classical utilitarian social welfare function and the minimax social welfare function.

Answer:

The classical utilitarian social welfare function and the minimax social welfare function represent two different approaches to evaluating social welfare, each with its own ethical foundations and implications for the distribution of resources in society. Here’s a comparison of the two:

Classical Utilitarian Social Welfare Function

Classical utilitarianism is based on the principle of maximizing total or average utility across all individuals in society. The classical utilitarian social welfare function is usually expressed as:
W = i = 1 n U i W = i = 1 n U i W=sum_(i=1)^(n)U_(i)W = \sum_{i=1}^{n} U_iW=i=1nUi
Where:
  • W W WWW is the total social welfare.
  • U i U i U_(i)U_iUi is the utility of individual i i iii.
  • n n nnn is the number of individuals in society.

Key Characteristics:

  1. Maximization of Total Utility:
    • The objective is to maximize the sum of utilities across all individuals, leading to the greatest total happiness or well-being.
  2. Equality vs. Efficiency:
    • Utilitarianism tends to focus more on efficiency (maximizing total welfare) rather than on equality. As a result, it may justify unequal distributions of resources if that leads to a higher total utility.
  3. Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility:
    • It assumes that utilities can be compared and summed across individuals, which implies a form of interpersonal utility comparison.
  4. Implication for Resource Allocation:
    • Utilitarianism might support policies that increase total welfare, even if they lead to significant inequality. For example, if giving more resources to wealthier individuals (who might have higher marginal utility for those resources) increases total utility, it could be justified under utilitarianism.

Example:

  • Imagine a policy that provides significant benefits to a wealthy person and smaller benefits to a poor person, such that the total benefit (in utility terms) is maximized. A classical utilitarian approach would endorse this policy if it results in the highest aggregate utility, even if it increases inequality.

Minimax Social Welfare Function (Rawlsian Approach)

The minimax social welfare function is based on the principle of maximin or Rawlsian justice, named after philosopher John Rawls. This approach focuses on maximizing the utility of the worst-off individual in society. The minimax social welfare function can be expressed as:
W = min ( U 1 , U 2 , , U n ) W = min ( U 1 , U 2 , , U n ) W=min(U_(1),U_(2),dots,U_(n))W = \min(U_1, U_2, \dots, U_n)W=min(U1,U2,,Un)
Where:
  • W W WWW is the social welfare.
  • U i U i U_(i)U_iUi is the utility of individual i i iii.
  • The function min min min\minmin takes the minimum utility among all individuals.

Key Characteristics:

  1. Maximization of the Minimum Utility:
    • The goal is to maximize the welfare of the individual with the least utility, ensuring that the worst-off person is as well-off as possible.
  2. Focus on Equality and Fairness:
    • The minimax approach prioritizes equality and fairness over efficiency. It advocates for reducing inequalities and improving the welfare of the least advantaged members of society.
  3. No Interpersonal Comparisons Needed:
    • Unlike utilitarianism, the minimax criterion does not require summing up or comparing utilities across individuals. It only requires identifying the person with the lowest utility and improving their welfare.
  4. Implication for Resource Allocation:
    • Policies under the minimax criterion would be designed to improve the situation of the worst-off individuals, even if it means sacrificing some overall efficiency or total welfare. This could lead to more equitable distributions of resources.

Example:

  • Suppose a policy could either increase the utility of the poorest individual slightly or significantly increase the utility of a wealthier individual. A minimax approach would favor the policy that improves the utility of the poorest individual, regardless of the impact on total utility.

Key Differences

Aspect Classical Utilitarian Social Welfare Function Minimax (Rawlsian) Social Welfare Function
Objective Maximize total (or average) utility Maximize the utility of the worst-off individual
Approach to Equality Focuses on efficiency, may lead to inequality Focuses on fairness and equality
Interpersonal Comparisons Requires comparisons and summation of utilities Does not require summation, focuses on the minimum utility
Resource Allocation May justify unequal distribution if total welfare increases Prioritizes equal distribution, improving the welfare of the least advantaged
Philosophical Foundation Benthamite utilitarianism Rawlsian theory of justice

Conclusion

The classical utilitarian social welfare function and the minimax social welfare function represent two distinct ethical perspectives on how to evaluate and improve social welfare. While utilitarianism seeks to maximize total utility, potentially at the cost of greater inequality, the minimax approach focuses on improving the welfare of the least advantaged, emphasizing fairness and equality. The choice between these approaches depends on the ethical priorities of a society or policymaker, particularly regarding the trade-off between efficiency and equality.
 
 
 
 

Question:-10

 
 

Differentiate between a sequential game and a simultaneous game with the help of examples.

Answer:

In game theory, sequential games and simultaneous games represent different types of strategic interactions between players.

Sequential Game:

In a sequential game, players make decisions one after another, with each player being aware of the previous players’ choices. This means that later players can use the information about earlier decisions to inform their strategies. These games are often represented using game trees.

Example:

Consider the game of chess:
  • Players: Two (Player 1 and Player 2).
  • Turns: Player 1 moves first, and Player 2 responds, knowing Player 1’s move.
  • Strategy: Since Player 2 knows what Player 1 has done, Player 2 can choose a move that best responds to Player 1’s strategy.
  • Representation: The game can be represented as a tree, where each branch represents a possible move by a player.

Simultaneous Game:

In a simultaneous game, all players make their decisions at the same time, without knowing the choices of the other players. These games are usually represented using payoff matrices.

Example:

Consider the Prisoner’s Dilemma:
  • Scenario: Two suspects are arrested and interrogated separately. They can either cooperate with each other by staying silent or betray the other by confessing.
  • Players: Two (Prisoner 1 and Prisoner 2).
  • Choices: Both prisoners must decide simultaneously whether to confess or remain silent.
  • Strategy: Each prisoner has to make a decision without knowing what the other will do.
  • Representation: The game is represented by a payoff matrix showing the outcomes for each combination of choices (e.g., both confess, both stay silent, one confesses while the other stays silent).

Key Differences:

  • Order of Play: In sequential games, players take turns making decisions, while in simultaneous games, all players make decisions at the same time.
  • Information: In sequential games, players can observe previous moves, whereas in simultaneous games, decisions are made without knowledge of the others’ choices.
  • Representation: Sequential games are often represented by game trees, while simultaneous games are represented by payoff matrices.

Summary Example:

  • Sequential Game: A chess match where each player takes turns and can see the previous move.
  • Simultaneous Game: The Prisoner’s Dilemma where both players choose their actions (confess or stay silent) without knowing what the other will do.
 
 
 
 

Search Free Solved Assignment

Just Type atleast 3 letters of your Paper Code

Scroll to Top
Scroll to Top